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This afternoon I will focus on two 
tenets that I believe should guide 
monetary policymaking. First, I am 
convinced that price stability enhances 
economic welfare by creating an envi-
ronment in which people can make 
better decisions—decisions that are 
conducive to long-term economic 
growth and stability.
Second, I think that central banks can 
be more effective when they act sys-
tematically and transparently. In my 
remarks, I will talk about the behaviors 
that have made the FOMC successful 
in this regard.
Finally, I will conclude with a few 
remarks about the current state of the 
economy and monetary policy.
  Price Stability Enhances 
Economic Welfare
Let me start with my ﬁ  rst tenet: price 
stability enhances economic welfare. 
Indeed, I regard maintaining price sta-
bility as essential for optimum perfor-
mance of the overall economy. That is 
why price stability is a primary objec-
tive of monetary policy.
Under the leadership of my prede-
cessors, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland established a strong commit-
ment to the primacy of price stability. 
These leaders saw the pursuit of price 
stability as the key to achieving the 
most favorable outcomes for sustain-
able economic growth.
Their position, that the FOMC should 
establish a policy of “zero inﬂ  ation,” 
or price stability as it became known, 
seems much more reasonable today. 
Back then, though, their perspective 
was viewed as radical. The conﬂ  ict 
arose because some people thought that 
price stability and economic stabiliza-
tion were not compatible goals.
Although price stability has been an 
explicit objective of monetary policy 
since the earliest Congressional man-
date in 1946, the beneﬁ  ts of price 
stability were not widely appreciated 
until more recently. Today, monetary 
policymakers routinely talk about the 
positive beneﬁ  ts gained from achieving 
price stability.
Moreover, I believe that it is now 
widely recognized that sustained inﬂ  a-
tion—or deﬂ  ation for that matter—is a 
monetary policy phenomenon. In other 
words, I think the Federal Reserve 
owns the sole responsibility for achiev-
ing and maintaining price stability in 
the United States.
  Acting Systematically and 
Transparently
Let me turn to my second tenet: 
central banks can be more effective 
when they act systematically and trans-
parently. Only then will the public 
understand how to interpret individual 
policy actions.
I will elaborate on three behaviors that 
I believe have made the FOMC more 
systematic and transparent: 
• Anchoring  inﬂ  ation expectations,
•  Acting predictably, and
•  Drawing on credibility to deal with 
unusual circumstances.
  Anchoring Inﬂ  ation 
Expectations
First let me address the idea of anchor-
ing inﬂ  ation expectations. Economists 
and policymakers today agree that 
expectations play a key role in inﬂ  ation 
dynamics. People who act on mistaken 
beliefs about future inﬂ  ation make 
decisions that they may later come to 
regret. Because central banks control 
the trend rate of inﬂ  ation over time, it 
seems natural for central banks to do 
everything they can to inform the 
public about the trend rate of inﬂ  ation 
and to convince the public to regard 
the information as credible.
The FOMC did not have a formal, 
numerical inﬂ  ation target as it set about 
to achieve price stability two decades 
ago, and it does not have such a target 
today. I think that the FOMC infor-
mally set an upper-limit guidepost 
for inﬂ  ation after the turbulent 1970s, 
when inﬂ  ation was very high and vari-
able. The decade of the 1980s brought 
a deﬁ  nite improvement, with core inﬂ  a-
tion ﬂ  uctuating in the neighborhood of 
4 to 5 percent.
During the 1990s, the FOMC paid 
close attention to managing inﬂ  ation 
expectations. Chairman Greenspan and 
other Committee members talked regu-
larly about their commitment to achiev-
ing price stability. If you recall, some 
members spoke about “opportunistic 
disinﬂ  ation,” which was their way of 
saying that in the process of leaning 
against inﬂ  ation, they were willing to 
take advantage of opportunities to lock 
in even lower rates of inﬂ  ation when 
those situations presented themselves. 
To me, this is simply evidence that the 
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to minimize undesirable ﬂ  uctuations in 
real economic activity along the path to 
price stability. But the FOMC’s inten-
tion regarding the direction of inﬂ  ation 
was clear. 
As a result of this strategy, inﬂ  ation 
gradually drifted down during the 
1990s, and core CPI inﬂ  ation fell to 
1 percent last year. Inﬂ  ation that low, 
plus subpar economic performance, 
prompted the FOMC to express con-
cern about the remote possibility of a 
disruptive deﬂ  ation. As you are well 
aware, this time the FOMC worked 
hard to condition inﬂ  ation expectations 
in a different direction, speciﬁ  cally to 
convince the public that further disin-
ﬂ  ation was unwelcome.
So has the FOMC really anchored 
inﬂ  ation expectations? According to 
some ﬁ  nancial market indicators and 
inﬂ  ation surveys, the public’s long-
term inﬂ  ation expectation has consis-
tently drifted downward during the past 
decade. What is more, such assess-
ments of inﬂ  ation expectations appear 
to have become less variable.
My conclusion is that the public 
expects the trend rate of inﬂ  ation to 
move within a fairly narrow and low 
range over the next decade and beyond. 
This expectation is largely attributable 
to the credibility the Federal Reserve 
has established.
One might ask: Why does the FOMC 
not formally adopt explicit inﬂ  ation tar-
get ranges, as many other central banks 
around the world have done? This is 
one area in which intelligent people 
agree on the objective but disagree on 
the strategy for achieving the objective.
An important argument in favor of 
explicit inﬂ  ation targets is that such an 
approach may provide greater certainty 
in anchoring inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation 
expectations. A key argument against 
explicit targets is the potential for 
reduced ﬂ  exibility.
I think it is well known by most econo-
mists that the economic performance 
of countries with and without explicit 
inﬂ  ation targets has not been signiﬁ  -
cantly different over the past decade. 
And yet, the experiences to date are 
still very limited. I am sure that policy-
makers will learn more over time than 
we know today from the experiences of 
other central banks.
An important question to address is 
whether greater transparency and con-
sistency can provide beneﬁ  ts similar to 
those brought about by explicit inﬂ  a-
tion targets.
   Acting Predictably
This leads me to my second behavioral 
characteristic for monetary policy: act-
ing predictably. I think that it is a good 
practice for central banks to act predict-
ably in response to information about 
the state of the economy. Markets are 
surprised enough by nonpolicy events 
without central bankers adding more 
noise.
In the world of economic theory, this 
predictable behavior can result from 
following a policy rule. Consider the 
familiar Taylor rule. When John Taylor 
proposed his rule more than a decade 
ago, he did not intend for policymakers 
to adhere to it rigidly or slavishly. On 
the contrary, he formulated it to cap-
ture a general set of principles he found 
robust for stabilizing inﬂ  ation and out-
put in the course of building macro 
models. It was only later that he and 
others discovered that these principles 
seemed to roughly characterize FOMC 
behavior after the mid-1980s, a period 
of quite successful monetary policy.
As is true for explicit inﬂ  ation targets, 
you might ask why central banks are 
not more explicit about their rules. 
There could be beneﬁ  ts, of course. If 
a central bank could be more precise 
about what aspects of the environment 
it plans to respond to in every situa-
tion, and how it plans to respond, then 
the public might better anticipate and 
understand policy actions. In turn, the 
policies themselves might be more 
effective.
I am not ready to embrace a particu-
lar rule as part of a real-life monetary 
policy strategy, but I am encouraged 
that the design of policy rules is an 
enormously active research area right 
now. Economists are studying rules 
that respond to different kinds of cir-
cumstances, such as ﬁ  nancial market 
developments. They are also studying 
different ways to respond to incom-
ing information. I think it is fair to 
say that the research community is far 
from reaching a consensus about how 
central banks should employ explicit 
rules in real-time policymaking. But if 
the past is a reliable guide, policymak-
ers will beneﬁ  t considerably from the 
insights that emerge from this research. 
However, we do not have to wait for 
conclusive results to know that even 
without an explicit policy rule, central 
bankers are learning how to gain simi-
lar beneﬁ  ts through greater transpar-
ency and more effective public com-
munication. Over the past decade, the 
FOMC has provided more detailed and 
frequent information about its goals 
and the various impediments that may 
arise in achieving these goals. In just 
the past several years, the Committee 
has been paying particular attention to 
the wording of its press statements in 
an effort to be as transparent and pre-
dictable as possible. 
   Drawing on Credibility
The third characteristic that the FOMC 
has used to conduct systematic and 
transparent policy has been its judi-
cious use of credibility to deal with 
unusual circumstances. Some poli-
cymakers are skeptical about using a 
policy rule in part because the practice 
may hamper them from responding to 
unusual situations in which experience 
tells them to override the rule. But I 
believe that the Committee’s responses 
to such situations can be consistent 
with rule-like behavior.
The Taylor rule may be a reasonably 
good description of how monetary 
policy unfolds in normal times. But 
abnormal times—the 1987 stock market 
crash, the 1997–98 currency crises, and 
9/11—require policies that do not ﬁ  t 
so neatly into the Taylor-rule box. And 
those policies—the normal policies in 
abnormal times, if you will—need not 
be viewed as a failure to deliver system-
atic policy as long as we are clear about 
the rationale for our actions. 
We know that policymakers must 
operate with incomplete and imper-
fect information, so it is easy to see 
how tensions between predictable 
and uncommon policy actions could 
emerge. Just how have such tensions 
been resolved in practice? My evalu-
ation of the past 20 years leads me 
to conclude that the behavior of the 
FOMC has deviated from the prescrip-
tions of Taylor-type rules on several 
occasions, but that these excursions 
have not impaired the FOMC’s cred-
ibility. Indeed these deviations have 
served to build the FOMC’s credibility. 
In fact, with experience, the FOMC has 
become more predictable in its response 
to ﬁ  nancial market disruptions and in its 
communication about policy actions.To develop these ideas more concretely, 
it is useful to review a series of policy 
episodes that added to the stock of the 
FOMC’s credibility. The October 1987 
stock-market crash, for example, forced 
the FOMC to temporarily relax its 
longer-term course of policy restraint—
a policy dictated by increasing inﬂ  ation-
ary pressures. With only partial credibil-
ity, the Committee had to aggressively 
boost the funds rate after it had become 
clear that the market stabilized.
Ultimately, however, the FOMC gained 
additional credibility as inﬂ  ation began 
to decline to a lower trend rate.
A second instructive episode is known 
as the “headwinds” period. During the 
early 1990s, it was well understood that 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries were ﬁ  nding 
it difﬁ  cult to lend because their capital 
had been depleted from loan losses in 
commercial real estate. The restricted 
credit supply persisted much longer 
than it would have in a normal recov-
ery. Given the increased credibility of 
the FOMC, it turned out that the real 
federal funds rate that was effectively 
zero could be maintained at that low 
level for about 15 months.
This policy was probably somewhat 
more accommodative than a Taylor-
type rule would have called for. Later, 
the FOMC quickly returned the fed-
eral funds rate to a more neutral stance 
and resumed its pursuit of price stabil-
ity. This overall approach extended the 
credibility on which the Committee has 
been drawing recently.
The FOMC enjoyed the beneﬁ  ts of 
such credibility when international 
ﬁ  nancial markets were hit with a trio 
of problems in the late 1990s: the 
Asian currency crisis, the Russian debt 
default, and the collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management.
Greater credibility at that time gave the 
FOMC the ﬂ  exibility to implement a 
somewhat lower funds rate for a longer 
period than it otherwise might have. A 
similar deviation occurred during the 
period surrounding the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001. In each of 
these cases, knowing when the shocks 
have passed obviously requires sound 
judgment.
These episodes convince me that 
the FOMC can draw on its credibility 
as a successful steward of price stabil-
ity in order to deal with unusual cir-
cumstances. If the Federal Reserve has 
developed sufﬁ  cient credibility, and 
if we explain ourselves clearly, then 
the public—like those of you in this 
room—will understand our intentions.
Before I turn to the current outlook, let 
me summarize my thoughts. I am opti-
mistic that the policy process will con-
tinue to evolve in the favorable way it 
has done over the past 20 years. The 
basis for my optimism is straightfor-
ward. I believe that the three charac-
teristics I described above—anchoring 
inﬂ  ation expectations, demonstrating 
consistent behavior, and judiciously 
drawing on our credibility to deal with 
unusual circumstances—will be main-
tained as a permanent part of the 
policymaking process.
   Current Policy Situation
Now let me shift my focus to the 
current policy environment. You are 
familiar with the adage among busi-
ness cycle analysts that steep recessions 
are usually followed by sharp rebounds 
and mild recessions are followed by 
less robust recoveries. That shoe seems 
to ﬁ  t for the nation’s most recent reces-
sion and recovery period.
As you know, the recession that ran 
from March 2001 through November 
2001 was fairly mild. The expansion is 
now nearly 2½ years old, and the pace 
of this expansion has also been fairly 
moderate. Personal consumption, resi-
dential investment, and government 
purchases supported the expansion in 
its early stages. More recently, busi-
ness ﬁ  xed investment has been steam-
ing ahead, and the March employ-
ment report was a welcomed piece of 
news. The signs are pointing toward an 
economy that is getting its feet ﬁ  rmly 
planted.
Having said that, we also know that 
there are always unknowns in the out-
look. It is no secret that despite the 
recent labor report, net job creation has 
been on a much slower track than vir-
tually anyone would have imagined, 
given the actual strength in spending. 
Of course, we know that arithmeti-
cally, strong productivity growth makes 
the GDP and employment numbers ﬁ  t 
together. What we do not know is how 
much of the exceptional productivity 
performance is cyclical and how much 
is structural.
To the extent that this strong productiv-
ity growth is cyclical, we should expect 
productivity growth rates to move down 
toward a more normal rate, closer to 
2–2½ percent, and for employment 
growth to accelerate notably at the 
same time. To the extent that it is struc-
tural, we should expect to see a smaller 
deceleration in productivity growth and 
a slower acceleration on hiring.
Unfortunately, it is difﬁ  cult to know 
how much of each factor is involved. 
On the cyclical side of the debate, we 
sense that ﬁ  rms are hesitant to build 
inventory and add to their payrolls. 
Lingering concerns may dissipate as 
the expansion continues, and the pace 
of hiring may intensify. On the struc-
tural side of the debate, I hear from 
many of my district contacts that they 
are designing their business processes 
to take advantage of new technolo-
gies. They believe they can continue to 
achieve robust productivity growth for 
quite some time. We also see that one 
of the strongest components of capital 
spending is in the information technol-
ogy sector. This is a sector whose prod-
ucts complement business process re-
engineering.
A second unknown in the outlook 
is how the price level will evolve. 
Although the core consumer price inﬂ  a-
tion has been falling for several years, 
the March number gives some reason 
for pause. At the moment, ﬁ  rm evidence 
of persistent inﬂ  ationary pressures may 
be limited, but there might be some 
straws in the wind foreshadowing an 
end to disinﬂ  ation.
Prices of a wide range of commodi-
ties, such as steel, lumber, copper, 
and energy supplies, have been rising 
steeply during the past year. My busi-
ness contacts do not report any changes 
in these markets, and indeed, they indi-
cate that for the ﬁ  rst time in a long 
time, they have been able to pass along 
some cost increases from raw materials 
to their customers. Prices of imported 
consumer goods have stopped fall-
ing and are now beginning to increase. 
Against the backdrop of a depreciated 
dollar, it would not be surprising to 
see some further increases in imported 
goods prices. 
Moreover, if you believe that the 
economy’s momentum has turned and 
strengthened appreciably, then you 
might logically conclude that inﬂ  ation-
ary pressures are more likely than not 
to emerge as the expansion progresses, 
unless monetary policy adjusts. 
I do know this—and I might just be the 
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said it publicly—the current federal 
funds rate, at 1 percent, is too low to be 
sustainable. At some point, preserving 
price stability will require the FOMC 
to move the funds rate back up to keep 
monetary policy neutral with respect to 
inﬂ  ation. Failure to respond in a timely 
fashion puts our hard-won credibility 
at risk.
This credibility has proved to be a 
valuable asset in dealing with the very 
unusual recovery we are experienc-
ing. It has provided us with a somewhat 
lengthy chunk of time to analyze our 
situation and respond to it. Broad-based 
inﬂ  ation pressures have yet to emerge, 
and I am conﬁ  dent that the FOMC will 
act, as necessary, to preserve the hard-
won gains it has already achieved.
  Conclusion
My goal today has been to convey to 
you some of my ideas about monetary 
policy.
I am convinced that price stability 
enhances economic welfare by creat-
ing an environment in which people 
make better decisions—decisions that 
are conducive to long-term economic 
growth and stability. Indeed, I regard 
maintaining price stability as essential 
for achieving optimum performance of 
the economy.
I think that central banks can be more 
effective when they act as systemati-
cally and transparently as they can. 
Systematic and transparent behavior 
can easily accommodate extraordi-
nary actions in extraordinary times. 
But at all times, the Federal Reserve 
has the responsibility to explain what it 
is doing, why, and how its actions are 
consistent with its long-term objectives.
I hope that I have convinced you that 
the credibility gained from successful 
monetary policy is a precious asset. In 
my role as a monetary policymaker, I 
plan to behave like a steward, maintain-
ing and, where possible, building on 
this credibility.